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{Pell. endf:'. § il23) and the crime of extortion involves moral
turpitude. (.llatter of Coffey, 123 CaL 522 L56 P. 448].)
It is, therefore, ordered that Manassee Stephen Libarian
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
mOllths commencing 30 days after the date of the filing of
t his opinion.

CARTER, J.-I dissent.
1 agree that the letter written by petitioner to Nadel's
attoruey constituted a technical violation of section 523 of
the Penal Code, and should not, therefore, have been sent.
But, considering petitioner's background and the fact that
the letter was written to an attorney regarding a claim against
hili client involving a small sum of money, advising that
petitioner's client would go to the district attorney and seek
to institute a criminal prosecution against Nadel unless the
claim was paid, I do not feel that the discipline recommended
is justified, and that a reprimand would be more commensurate with the nature of the conduct shown by the record.
Petitioner, no doubt, mistakenly believed that the end he
sought to achieve justified the means employed, and since
no fraud or bad faith on his part was shown, and no detriment was suffered by anyone as the result of his conduct, a
suspension of six months from practice seems too severe.
I would, therefore, dispose of the proceeding with a reprimand.
[L. A. Xo. 22158. In Bank. Jan. 29, 1952.]

S'l'A'fE ReBBISH COLLECTORS ASSOCIATION (a Corporation), Appellant, v. JOHN W. SILIZNOFF, Respondent.

[11 Assault-CivU Cases-Threats.-A cause of action is established when it is shown that one,in the absence of any privilt·ge. intcntionall~' subjects another to the mental suffering
incident to serious threats to his physical well-being, whether
01' not the threats are made under such circumstances as to
constitute a technical assault.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Assault, § 49; [2] Damages, § 22;
[3] Torts, §4.1; [4] Damages, §23; [5] Evidence, §I71; [6] Evidence, §I77; [7] Constitutional Law, § 120; [8] Trial, §159;
[9) Assault, ~ 58(2); [10] Trial, § 136; [11] Appeal and Error,
§ 195; [12] Agency, § 193; [13] Damages, § 89; [14] Damages, § 95.
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[2] Damages-Mental Suffering.-If a cause of action is otherwise established, dmnagl's may he gi\'cn for mental suffering
naturally ensuing froll1 the acts complained of, and in caseR
where mental suffering constitutes the principal or major
I'lemellt of damages a recovery will not be denied because
defendant's intentional misconduct fell sllOrt of producing
some physical injury.
[3] Torts-Interference With Mental or Emotional Tranquillity.That administrative difficulties may arise in determining what
in\"aRions of mental and emotional tranquillity are sufficiently
serious to be actionable does not warrant denial of relief.
[4] Damages-Mental Suffering-rright.-A rubbish collectors' association is liable for damages for illness resulting from fright
caused br its threats to compel defendant either to give up
or pay for II collection account which he took from an association member.
[5] Evidence-Threats.-In a cross-action by defendant against a
rubbish collectors' association for damages for illness resulting from fright caused by its threats to compel defendant
to give up or pay for a collection account which he took
froll1 an association member, evidence of threats made by
the association inspector and its directors against other nonmembers of the association to compel them to relinquish
accounts which they had solicited from customers of members is rele\'ant and admissible for the purpose of showing
methods adopted by the association to protect its members
from competition by nonmembers.
[6] Id.-Value of Property. - In a cross-action by defendant
against a rubbish collectors' association for'damages for iIInl'ss resulting from fright caused by its threats to compel
defendant Pit her to give up or pay for a collection account
w'hich he took from an association member, it is not error
to pxcillde evidence that rubbish accounts, including the account in question, constitute property rights and have definite
property values in the rubbish collection business, where such
pvidpnce is immaterial in view of the fact that defendant
~I'eurl'd the account, not through the association member, but
b~· l'oli~iting it fi'om thc customer.
[2] Right to recover for mental pain and anguish alone, apart
from other damages, notes, 23 A.L.R. 361; 44 A.L.R. 428; 56
A.L.R. 657. See, also, CaI.Jur., Damages, § 34; Am.Jur., Torts,
§ 55.
[3] Civil liability for insulting or abusive language not amounting to defamation, note, 15 A.L.R.2d 108. See, also, Am.Jur.
Torts, § 45 et seq.
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[7] Constitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Right to Engage
in Occupations.-A nonmember of a rubbish collectors' association has a right to compete for a customer's business in
the open market, and if he takes such business from an association member he is under no obligation to pay such member for it.
[8] Trial-Instructions-Applicability to Evidence.-In a crossaction by defendant against a rubbish collectors' association
for damages for illness resulting from fright caused by its
threats to compel defendant either to give up or pay for a
collection account which he took from an association member, it is not error to instruct the jury that no legal arbitration had taken place between the parties, although the bylaws of the association provide for arbitration between the
members in case of dispute, where defendant did not join
the association until after the dispute over the account was
purportedly settled, and there is no evidence that he agreed
before that time to submit the controversy to the association's board of directors for settlement. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 1280 et seq.)
[9] Assault-Civil Cases-Instructions.-In a cross-action by defendant against a rubbish collectors'. association for damages
for illness resulting from fright caused by its threats to compel defendant either to give up or pay for a collection account which he took from an association member, an instruction that "an unlawful intent by one to inflict injury upon
the person of another is that intent to act which wilfully
disregards the right of a person to live without being placed
in fear of personal safety" does not inform the jury that
it may return a verdict for defendant based on a finding
of an unlawful intent alone.
[10] Trial-Instructions-Requests-Necessity for.-A party desiring more specific instructions on the law of the case should
request them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 607a.)
[11] Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel.-Alleged prejudicial misconduct of counsel may not be raised on appeal where
no objections or assignments of misconduct were made at the
trial, and the court was not asked to instruct the jury to disregard the challenged remarks.
[12] Agency-Relation Between Principal and Third Person-Delicta of Agent.-In a cross-action by defendant against a rubbish collectors' association for damages for illness resulting
from fright caused by its threats to compel defendant either
to give up or pay for a collection account which he took from
an association member, the association cannot attack a judgment against it because of the jury's failure to return a verdict against its agent, alleged to be the principal·tort feasor,
where there is nothing in the pleadings or instructions which
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indicates that the failure to find with respect to the agent
was intended as a verdict in his favor, and the transcript of
proceedings on motion for new trial indicates that it was
an inadvertence on the part of the jury caused by failure
to provide it with a form for a verdict against him.
[13] Damages-Excessive Damages-When Award Will Be Set
Aside.-Question of excessive damages is addressed primarily
to the discretion of the trial court, and an award which
stands approved by that court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the jury was influenced by passion
or prejudice.
[14] ld.-Excessive Damages-Illness Resulting From Fright.In a cross-action by defendant against a rubbish collectors'
association for damages for illness resulting from fright
caused by its threats to compel defendant either to give up
or pay for a collection account which he took from an association member, a verdict awarding defendant $1,250 general and special damages was not so excessive as to indicate
that it was the result of prejudice and passion; and any
excessiveness in an additional award of $7,500 exemplary
damages was cured by the trial court's reduction of those
damages to $4,000.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William S. Baird, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by an association on promissory notes, in which
defendant filed cross-complaint to cancel notes and for damages for assaults made by plaintiff and its agents to compel
him to join the association and pay for a collection account
taken from an association member. JUdgment for defendant
affirmed.
John C. Stevenson and Lionel Richman for. Appellant.
Borah & Borah and Peter T; Rice for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-On February 1, 1948, Peter Kobzeff signed
a contract with the Acme Brewing Company to collect rubbish from the latter's brewery. Kobzeff had been in the
rubbish business for several years and was able to secure
the contract because Acme was dissatisfied with the service
then being provided by another collector, one Abramoff.
Although Kobzeff signed the contract, it was understood that
the work should be done by John Siliznoff, Kobzeff's 80n-
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in-law, whom Kobzeff wished to assist in establishing a rubbish collection business.
Both Kobzeff and Abramoff were members of the plaintiff
State Rubbish Collectors Association, but Siliznoff was not.
The b~'-laws of the association provided that one member
should not take an account from another member without
paying for it. Usual prices ranged from five to ten times
the monthly rate paid by the customer, and disputes were
l'pferred to the board of directors for settlement. After
Abramoff lost the Acme account he complained to the asso('iation, and Kobzeff was called upon to settle the matter.
Kobzeff aud Silizl10ff took the position that the Acme ac('ollnt belonged to Silizl1off, and that he was under no obligation to pay for it. After attending several meetings of plaintiff's board of directors Siliznoff finally agreed, however,
to pay Abramoff $1,850 for the Acme account and join the
association. The agreement provided that he should pay
$500 in 30 days and $75 per month thereafter until the
whole sum agreed upon was paid. Payments were to be
made through the association, and Siliznoff executed a series
of promissory notes totaling $1,850. None of these notes
was paid, and in 1949 plaintiff association brought this action
to collect the notes then payable. Defendant cross-complained
and- asked that the notes be cancelled because of duress and
waut of consideration. In addition he sought general and
exemplary damages because of assaults made by plaintiff and
its agents to compel him to join the association and pay
Abl'amofl' for the Acme account. The jury returned a verdict against plaintiff and for defendant on the complaint
and for defendant on his cross-complaint. It awarded him
$1,250 general and special damages and $7,500 exemplary
damages. The trial court denied a motion for a new trial
on the condition that defendant consent to a reduction of
the exemplary damages to $4,000. Defendant filed the required consent, and plaintiff has appealed from the judgment.
Plaintiff's primary contention is that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment. Defendant testified that
shortly after he secured the Acme account, the president of
the association and its inspector, John Andikian, called on
him and Kobzeff. They suggested that either a settlement
be made with Abramoff or that the job be dropped, and reo
quested Kobzeff and defendant to attend a meeting of the
association. At this meeting defendant was told that the
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association "ran all the rubbish from that office. aU thE'
rubbish hauling," and that if he did not pay for the job
the~' would take it away from him. "'We would take it
away. even if we had to haul for nothing' . . . [O]ne of
them mentioned that I had better pay up, or else." Thereafter, on the day. when defendant finally agreed to pay for
the account, Andikian visited defendant at the Rainier Brewing Company, where he was collecting rubbish. Andikian
told defendant that" 'We will give you up till tonight to
get down to the board meeting and make some kind of arrangements or agreements about the Acme Brewery, or otherwise we are going to beat you up.' ... He says he either
would hire somebody or do it himself. And I says, ' Well,
what would they do to me l' He says, well, they would physically beat me up first, cut up the truck tires or burn the
truek, or otherwise put me out of business completely. He
said if I didn't appE'ar at that meeting and make some kind
of all agreement that they would do that, but he says up
to then they would let me alone,but if I walked out of that
meeting that night they would beat me up for sure." Defendant attE'nded the meeting and protested that he owed
nothing for the Acme account and in any event could not
pay the amount demanded. He was again told by the president of the association that "that table right there [the
board of clirE'<!tol'S] ran all the rubbish collecting in Los Angeles and if there was any routes to be gotten that ther
would get them and distribute them among their members. . . ." After two hours of further discussion defendant
agreed to join the association and pay for the Acme account.
He promised to return the next day and sign the necessary
papers. He tE'stified that tlw only reason "they let me go
homE', is that. I promised that I would sign the notes the
very next morning." The president "made me promise on
m~' honor and ewrything else, and I was scared, and I knew i:
I had to ('ome back, so I beliew he knew I was scared anrl
that I would come back. That's the only reason they l('t
me go home." Defenl1allt also testified that because of th('
fright he suffered during his dispute with the associatio11
he became ill and vomited several times and had to remain
away from work for a period of several days.
Plaintiff contends that the evidence does not establish an
assault against defendant because the threats made all related to action that might take place in the future; that
neither Andikian nor members of the board of directors
i
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threatened immediate physical harm to d~fendant. (See
Lowry v. Stalldard Oil Co., 63 Cal.App.2d 1, 6-7 [146 P.2d
57] j Restatement, Torts, § 29.) [1] We have concluded, however, that a cause of action is established when it is shown
that one, in the absence of any privilege, intentionally subjects another to the mental suffering incident to' serious
threats to his physical well-being, whether or not the threats
are made under such circumstances as to constitute a technical assault.
In the past it has frequently been stated that the interest
in emotional and mental tranquillity is not one that the
law will protect from invasion in its own right. (Newman
v. Smith, 77 Cal. 22, 27 [18 P. 791] ; Easton v. United Trade
School (Jontr. Co., 173 Cal. 199, 204 [159 P. 597, L.R.A.
1917A 394] j Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal.App.2d 581, 584 [92 P.2d
434] j see 52 Am .•Jur., Torts, § 45, p. 388, and cases cited;
Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 41 Am.L.Reg., N.S., 141, 142-143.)
As late as 1934 the Restatement of Torts took the position
that" The interest in mental and emotional tranquillity and,
therefore, in freedom from mental and emotional disturbance
is not, as a thing in itself, regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended or
recognizably likely to cause such a disturbance." (Restatement, Torts, § 46, comment c.) The Restatement explained
the rule allowing recovery for the mere apprehension of
bodily harm in traditional assault cases as an historical
anomaly (§ 24, comment c), and the rule allowing recovery
for insulting conduct by an employee of a common carrier
as justified by the necessity of securing for the public comfortable as well as safe service. (§ 48, comment c.)
The Restatement recognized, however, that in many cases
mental distress could be so intense that it could reasonably
be foreseen that illness or other bodily harm might result.
If the defendant intentionally subjected the plaintiff to such
distress and bodily harm resulted, the defendant would be
liable for negligently causing the plaintiff bodily harm. (Restatement, Torts, §§ 306, 312.) Under this theery the cause
of action was not founded on a right to be free from intentional interference with mental tranquillity, but on the
right to be free from negligent interference with physical
well-being. A defendant who intentionally subjected another to mental distress without intending to cause bodily
harm would nevertheless be liable for resulting bodily harm
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if he should have foreseen that the mental distress might
cause such harm.
The California cases have been in accord with the Restatement in allowing recovery where physical injury re- I
suIted from intentionally subjecting the plaintiff to serious
mental distress. (Emden v. Vitz, 88 Cal.App.2d 313, 319
[198 P.2d 696] ; Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal.App.2d 793,
794-795 [216 P.2d 571]; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.
App.2d 124,129-130 [217 P.2d 113, 17 A.L.R.2d 929J.)
.
The view has been forcefully advocated that the law should
protect emotional and mental tranquillity as such against
serious and intentional invasions (see Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damages, 20 Mich.L.Rev. 497, 508-513;
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law
of Toris, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1064-1067; Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 Vanderbilt L.
Rev. 63, 81-82), and there is a growing body of case law
supporting this position. (See, e.g., Barnett v. Oollecti&n
Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 1312 [242 N.W. 25] ; Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal.App.2d 124, 129-130 [217 P.2d 113,
17 A.L.R.2d 929J; Prosser, Torts, § 11, p. 54 et seq., and
cases cited; 15 A.L.R.2d 108.) In recognition of this development the American Law Institute amended section 46
of the Restatement of Torts in 1947 to provide:
"One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally
causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for
such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting
from it. "
In explanation it stated that "The interest in freedom
from severe emotional distress is regarded as of sufficient
importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended
to invade it. Such conduct is tortious. The injury suffered
by the one whose interest is invaded is frequently far more
serious to him than certain tortious invasions of the interest
in bodily integrity and other legally protected interests. In
the absence of a privilege, the actor's conduct has no social
utility; indeed it is anti-social. No reason or policy requires
such an actor to be protected from the liability which usually
attaches to the wilful wrongdoer whose efforts are successfuL"
(Restatement of the Law, 1948 Supplement, Torts, § 46, comment d.)
There are persuasive arguments and analogies that support the recognition of a right to be free from serious, intentional, and unprivileged invasions of mental and emo-
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tional tranquillity. [2] If a cause of action. is otherwise
established, it is settled that damages may be given for mental
suffering naturally ensuing from the acts complained of
(Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Ca1.2d 109, 120 (130 P.2d 389] ; Merrill
v. Los Angeles Gas &- Elec. 00., 158 C&1.499, 513 [111 P. 534,
139 Am.St.Rep. 134, 31 L.R.A. N.S. 559]), and in the case
of many torts, snch as assault, battery, false imprisonment,
and defamation, mental suffering will frequently constitute
the principal element of damages. (See Deev1J v. Tassi, supra;
Restatement, Torts, § 905, comment c.) Incases where mental
suffering constitutes a major element of damages it is anomalons to deny recovery because the defendant's intentional
misconduct fell short of producing some physical injury.
It may be contended that to allow recovery in the absence of physical injury will open the door to unfounded
claims and a flood of litigation, and that the requirement
that there be physical injury is necessary to insure that serious mental snffering actually occurred. The jury is ordinarily in a better position, however, to determine whether
outrageous conduct results in mental distress than whether
that distress in turn results in physical injury. From their
own experience jurors are aware of the extent and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the
defendant's conduct, but a difficult medic&1question is presented when it must be determined if emotional distress resulted in physical injury. (See Smith, Relation of Emotions to 1njll.ry and Disease, 30 Va.L.Rev. 193, 303-306.)
Greater proof that mental suffering occurred is found in
the defendant's conduct designed to bring it about than
in physical injury that mayor may not have resulted therefrom.
[3] That administrative difficulties do not justify the denial of relief for serious invasions of mental and emotional
tranquillity is demonstrated by the cases recognizing the
right of privacy. Recognition of that right protects mental
tranquillity from invasion by unwarranted and undesired
publicity. (JlIelvin v. Reid, 112 Cal.App. 285, 289 (297 P.
91] ; Restatement, Torts, § 867, comments c and d.) As in
the case of the protection of mental tranquillity from other
forms of invasion, difficult probleIllS in determining the kind
and extent of invasions that are sufficiently serious to be
actionable are presented. Also the public interest in the
free dissemination of news must be considered. Nevertheless courts have concluded that the problems presented are
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not so insuperable that tllPY warrant the denial of relief
altogether.
[4] In the present ease plaintiff caused defendant to suff!'t, extreme fright. By intentionally producing such fright
it endeavored to compel him either to give up the Acme
account or pay for it, and it had no right or privilege to
adopt such coercive methods in competing for business. In
these circumstances liability is clear.
[5] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of threats made by Andikian and members
of the board of directors in 1950 against other nonmembers
of the association to compel them to relinquish accounts they
had solicited from customers of members of the association.
This evidence was admitted to show the methods adopted by
the association to protect its members from competition by
nonmembers. It was relevant and admissible for that purpose. (Evans v. Gibson, 220 Cal. 476, 482 [31 P.2d 389];
see People v, Coejield, 37 Ca1.2d 865, 869 [237 P.2d 570] ;
2 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] §§ 304, 371, pp. 202, 300.)
[6] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that rubbish accounts, including the Acme
account, constitute property rights and have definite property values in the rubbish collecting business. It contends
that because it was not allowed to prove the value of rubbish accounts it could not prove that there was consideration
for the notes signed by defendant. There would be merit in
plaintiff's contention if defendant had given the notes in
exchange for an assignment of the Acme contract or in connection with the purchase of a going business. He secured
the account, however, not through Abramoff, but by soliciting it from Acme. [7] He had a right to compete for this
business in the open market and was under no obligation to
pay Abramoff for it. (Conf1'nental Car-Na-Var Corp. v.
Moseley, 24 Cal.2d 104, 110 [148 P.2d 9].) Accordingly,
the trial court correctly concluded that evidence of its value
was immaterial.
[8] Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that no legal arbitration had taken place
between the parties. It points out that the by-laws provide
for arbitration between the members and contends that its
dispute with defendant was arbitrated under these provisions.
Defendant did not join the association, however, until after
the dispute over the Acme account was purportedly settled,
and there is no evidence that he agreed before that time to
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lIubmit the controversy to the association 's bo~d of directors for settlement. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.)
[9, 10] The trial court instructed the jury that" an unlawful intent by one to inflict injury upon the person of another is that intent to act which wilfully disr~gards the right
of a person to live without being placed in fear of personal
safety. " Because specific instructions were not given covering all the elements of defendant's cause of action, plaintiff contends that this specific instruction on intent allowed
the jury to return a verdict for defendant based on. a finding of an unlawful intent alone. The instruction does not,
however, so inform the jury, and had plaintiff desired more
specific instructions on· the law of the case, it should have
requested them. (Code Civ. Proc., § 607a; Hardy v. Schirmer, 163 Cal 272, 275 [124 P. 993] ; Perry v. City of San
Diego, 80 Cal.App.2d 166, 171-172 [181 P.2d 98].)
[11] Plaintiff contends that counsel for defendant was
guilty of prejudicial misconduct by making an inflammatory
closing argument to the jury. No objections or assignments
of misconduct were made at the trial, and the court was not
asked to instruct the jury to disregard the challenged remarks. It is therefore too late to· raise the point on appeal.
(Cope v. Davison, 30Cal.2d 193, 202 [180 P.2d 873, 171
A.L.R. 667]; Aydlott v. Key System Transit Co., 104 OaL
App. 621, 628 [286 P. 456].)
[12] Plaintiff cont~nds that the judgment against it cannot stand because the jury exonerated its agent Andikian,
who was the principal tort feasor. The jury did not exonerate Andikian, however; the verdict was merely silent as
to him. There is nothing in the pleadings or the instructions that indicates that the failure to find with respect to
Andikian was intended as a verdict in his favor, and the
transcript of the proceedings on the motion for new trial
indicates that it was an inadvertence on the part of the
jury caused by the failure to provide it with a form for a
verdict against him. Under these circumstances plaintiff
cannot attack the judgment against it because of the failure of the jury to return a verdict against its agent. (Brokaw v. Black-Foze Military Institute, 37 Oa1.2d 274, 279-280
[231 P.2d 816], and cases cited.)
[13] Plaintiff contends finally that the damages were excessive. The question of excessiveness is addressed primarily
to the discretion of the trial court, and an award that stands
approved by that court ~m not be disturbed on appeal un-
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